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SPACE, THE FINAL FRONTIER OF 
ENTERPRISE: INCENTIVIZING ASTEROID 
MINING UNDER A REVISED INTERNATIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 
Jack Heise* 
Introduction 
The Restaurant at the End of the Universe, a novel by Douglas Adams, 
describes a torture device called the Total Perspective Vortex. This virtual 
reality machine permits the being inside to grasp, for an instant, “the entire 
unimaginable infinity of creation” and their size within it, denoted by a “mi-
croscopic dot on a microscopic dot, which says ‘You are here.’ ”1  The re-
sulting sense of insignificance and smallness has the power to completely 
annihilate a sentient being’s brain.2 
Humans occupy and harness the resources of a miniscule percentage of 
the known universe. Stated broadly, the exploration of the universe presents 
challenges of both physics and engineering. The former refers to limits 
based on our current understanding of physics: travel at or faster than the 
speed of light, for example, would violate the general theory of relativity.3 
The latter describes challenges with respect to building the instruments that 
do not defy the laws of physics and ought to be possible to create. 
Asteroid mining—the extraction of raw materials from rocks in outer 
space—is a problem of engineering rather than physics. This endeavor both 
depends upon and tends to facilitate an increasingly robust industry of space 
exploration, tourism, and utilization of outer space resources–a collective 
group of business entities termed the “space economy.”4  Various studies 
 *  Managing Notes Editor, Michigan Journal of International Law; J.D. Candidate, 
University of Michigan Law School, 2019. I would like to the thank the many editors at MJIL 
who worked on this piece for their thoughtful feedback and keen attention to detail. I would 
also like to thank my friends and roommates at Michigan Law, family, and girlfriend for their 
support throughout law school and the writing of this note: my universe would be cold and 
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 1. Douglas Adams, The Restaurant at the End of the Universe 70 (1980). 
 2. Id. at 77. 
 3. Put plainly, this Theory posits that “as an object approaches the speed of light, 
its mass reaches infinity. So, in other words, a spacecraft couldn’t physically go as fast as 
light.” Elizabeth Howell, Engage Warp Drive! Why Interstellar Travel’s Harder Than It 
Looks, SPACE.COM (May 7, 2018), https://www.space.com/40507-interstellar-space-travel-
and-science-fiction.html. 
 4. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE SPACE ECONOMY AT A 
GLANCE 2007, at 13 (2007) (defining the space economy as: “All public and private actors 
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show asteroid mining to be possible and even financially lucrative.5 Private 
sector companies are scrambling to tackle this challenge, with the goal of 
extracting water to be used in space to sustain life and used as propellant.6 
Because this propellant would be available in space, it ameliorates one chal-
lenge of space travel, which is the extraordinary cost associated with 
launching each pound of cargo. By removing the need to carry all fuel asso-
ciated with the voyage at the point of launch, asteroid mining could dramat-
ically reduce the cost of space travel.7 
The existing international legal framework governing asteroid mining is 
a product of the Cold War era.8 The Outer Space Treaty (the “OST”) pro-
hibits “national appropriation” of celestial objects like asteroids “by claim 
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”9 A 
literal reading of this passage tends to prohibit the practice of asteroid min-
ing. The OST does, however, posit that “the exploration and use of outer 
space for peaceful purposes” is in the common interest of all mankind.10 
While the terms of the OST prohibit asteroid mining, it is an endeavor that 
is wholly within the spirit of the treaty as a practice that tends to facilitate 
space travel. 
This Note argues that the OST should be modified to provide explicit 
permission for private entities to engage in asteroid mining while maintain-
ing the principles of international peace and cooperation that the treaty es-
pouses as the core of the framework governing outer space. Part I explores 
the current state of asteroid mining with reference to the current objectives 
of companies conducting missions in this realm. Part II examines the OST 
as applied to the enterprise of asteroid mining by private companies. Part III 
considers the benefits and drawbacks of various regulatory schemes to gov-
ern asteroid mining. It argues for a solution based on the historical devel-
opment of the whaling industry that retains the principles and international 
character of the OST while still incentivizing asteroid mining. 
involved in developing and providing space-enabled products and services. It comprises a 
long value-added chain, starting with research and development actors and manufacturers of 
space hardware . . . and ending with the providers of space-enabled products . . . and ser-
vices . . . to final users.”). 
 5. See, e.g., KECK INST. FOR SPACE STUDIES, ASTEROID RETRIEVAL FEASIBILITY 
STUDY (2012), http://kiss.caltech.edu/final_reports/Asteroid_final_report.pdf. 
 6. See infra Section I(a). 
 7. See infra Section I(c). 
 8. See Loren Grush, How an International Treaty Signed 50 Years Ago Became the 
Backbone for Space Law, VERGE (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/27/
14398492/outer-space-treaty-50-anniversary-exploration-guidelines. 
 9. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 2, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
 10. Id. pmbl.  
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I. The Who, What, How, and Why of Asteroid Mining 
The premise of asteroid mining at first glance may not seem like it 
needs further explanation: the point is to extract material from big rocks in 
space. However, the nature of the actors involved in this endeavor warrants 
discussion given the difference between the spacefaring climate as the fram-
ers of the OST saw it and the present one. Moreover, the objective of aster-
oid mining companies—providing fuel and materials in space—tends to re-
duce costs associated with launch. Reduced launch costs facilitate space 
travel, in and of itself an evident purpose of the OST; facilitated space trav-
el, in turn, could deliver substantial benefits to all mankind, furthering an-
other stated purpose of the OST.11 
A.  The Business of Asteroid Mining 
A casual Internet search for asteroid mining is likely to turn up sky-high 
dollar value estimates of asteroids. From Neil deGrasse Tyson saying that 
asteroid mining will make the first trillionaire,12 to a Goldman Sachs note 
stating that a single asteroid could contain $25–$50 billion worth of plati-
num relative to a $2.6 billion cost of an asteroid-grabbing spacecraft,13 to 
reports that NASA is sending a probe to an asteroid worth $10,000 quadril-
lion, the profit element of this enterprise is not lost on observers.14 However, 
these estimates depend on the extraction of metals like platinum, their return 
to Earth, and sale at the current market price, which, as the aforementioned 
Goldman Sachs note concedes, would “crater the global price of plati-
num . . . .”15 
 11. See id. (stating “the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the explora-
tion and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,” as well as the belief that “the exploration 
and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the 
degree of their economic or scientific development . . . .”). 
 12. Joanna Rothkopf, Neil deGrasse Tyson Reveals How the World’s First Trillionaires 
Will Make Their Fortunes, SALON (May 4, 2015), https://www.salon.com/2015/05/04/
neil_degrasse_tyson_the_first_trillionaire_will_be_whoever_figures_out_how_to_mine_aster
oids. 
 13. Jim Edwards, Goldman Sachs: Space-Mining for Platinum Is ‘More Realistic Than 
Perceived,’ BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/goldman-sachs-
space-mining-asteroid-platinum-2017-4. 
 14. Brid-Aine Parnell, NASA Will Reach Unique Metal Asteroid Worth $10,000 Quad-
rillion Four Years Early, FORBES (May 26, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bridaineparnell/2017/05/26/nasa-psyche-mission-fast-tracked/#5dfa4f754ae8. 
 15. Edwards, supra note 13. Asteroid mining companies have a “ready made market if 
[they] take[] advantage of the fact that it costs roughly $20,000/Kg to launch something in to 
space[,]” not to mention that the “costs [of] getting a Kg of platinum just from orbit to ground 
level are pretty high . . . .” Alex Hern, If You’re Going to Mine in Space, the Last Thing to Do 
Is Bring Minerals Back Down to Earth, NEW STATESMAN AMERICA (Jan. 23, 2013), https://
www.newstatesman.com/technology/2013/01/if-youre-going-mine-space-last-thing-do-bring-
minerals-back-down-earth.  
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Instead of attempting to mine metals, the initial step in asteroid mining 
proposed by Planetary Resources, the most prominent asteroid mining com-
pany in existence today, is to mine asteroids for water.16 By making propel-
lant available in space, asteroid mining “increases the payload capacity of 
rockets, enables the creation of a space highway with fuel depots located at 
various points of need throughout the Solar System, and allows spacecraft to 
travel much farther.”17 In other words, the business of asteroid mining, at 
least in its infancy, is not about harvesting valuable metals and returning 
them to Earth,18 but rather about providing raw materials to enable the 
growth of the space economy. 
The impetus to provide in-space materials to the space economy is a 
matter of physics. Launching an object into space is expensive: SpaceX’s 
Falcon 9—with the capacity to carry just over 50,000 pounds of payload in-
to low Earth orbit19—costs an estimated $36.7 million to launch and uses 
between $200,000 and $300,000 in fuel each trip.20 If asteroid mining com-
panies were able to provide some of the propellant in space, that would not 
only reduce fuel costs, but would reduce the overall launch weight, freeing 
up more space for payload.21 
In sum, should asteroid mining companies be able to provide fuel in 
space, it could dramatically reduce the costs of transporting rockets and car-
go into space—both into low Earth orbit and to more distant targets, like 
Mars. Having this infrastructure in place could also reduce the long-term 
costs of the asteroid mining business itself, given that the business model 
involves launching objects into space. While a 2012 study estimated the to-
tal cost of an asteroid retrieval mission at $2.6 billion,22 a substantial reduc-
tion in launch costs would result in meaningful savings.23 This model of as-
 16. Products, PLANETARY RESOURCES, https://www.planetaryresources.com/products 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2018); see also Why Asteroids, PLANETARY RESOURCES, https://
www.planetaryresources.com/why-asteroids/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2018). 
 17. Products, supra note 16. 
 18. Planetary Resources does see mineral extraction as a long-term goal; however, 
there is currently an emphasis on providing construction materials to the in-space economy. 
See id. (stating that metals extracted from asteroids “will be used for in-space manufacturing 
of high-end electronics, laboratory equipment and spacecraft components.”). 
 19. Falcon 9, SPACEX, http://www.spacex.com/falcon9 (last visited Nov. 28, 2018). 
 20. Peter B. de Selding, SpaceX’s Reusable Falcon 9: What Are the Real Cost Savings 
for Customers?, SPACENEWS (Apr. 25, 2016), http://spacenews.com/spacexs-reusable-falcon-
9-what-are-the-real-cost-savings-for-customers. 
 21. See id. (noting that for reusable rockets, “[r]eserving fuel in the first stage for 
landing adds mass to the vehicle and deprives it of performance, effectively carrying 
fuel instead of extra payload . . . .”). 
 22. KECK INST. FOR SPACE STUDIES, supra note 5, at 13, 40–41. 
 23. Id. at 13 (noting that “[t]he recurring cost for subsequent [asteroid capture and re-
turn] missions is estimated at approximately $1B so subsequent missions would improve that 
cost savings to a factor of 20.”).  
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teroid mining as a provider of in-space resources, then, can facilitate the 
growth of the space economy: future forays into space would have their 
costs greatly reduced by a “space highway with fuel depots.”24 
B.  Public and Private Actors in the Asteroid Mining Space 
Both private companies and the space agencies of sovereign govern-
ments bear mentioning in a full discussion of asteroid mining. The role of 
the private sector in space has expanded substantially in the past decade, 
leading some commentators to suggest that the private sector has eclipsed 
the public sector in this arena.25 The asteroid mining industry, as detailed 
above, both depends upon and tends to facilitate this development. Sover-
eign space agencies, by contrast, conduct a waning share of activity in space 
and increasingly operate by way of public-private partnerships as an inves-
tor in the space economy.26 This marks an important shift from the factual 
backdrop of the original OST in that private, independent companies are in-
creasingly taking the wheel. 
As explored above, the asteroid mining business facilitates the growth 
of the space economy by reducing launch costs. However, the future of as-
teroid mining as a lucrative industry also depends upon the existence and 
growth of a robust space economy. The symbiotic relationships that could 
develop between private companies deserves emphasis. The viability of as-
teroid mining depends on a space economy to which asteroid mining com-
panies can sell fuel and metals: the lack of a current market in asteroid re-
sources should resolve itself “when the space population hits critical mass, 
demanding infrastructure.”27 For spaceflight companies,28 a crucial compo-
nent to reduce costs is access to propellant in space.29 
 24. Products, supra note 16. 
 25. See, e.g., Kristin Houser, Private Companies, Not Governments, Are Shaping the 
Future of Space Exploration, FUTURISM (June 12, 2017), https://futurism.com/private-
companies-not-governments-are-shaping-the-future-of-space-exploration (noting the substan-
tial expansion of the space economy in recent years and the shift toward the private sector); 
The New Space Race, ECONOMIST (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/
21735023-events-space-reflect-those-back-home-new-space-race (describing the growing role 
of the private sector in space). 
 26. See Elton Lossner, The New Space Race, HARV. POL. REV. (May 26, 2017), http://
harvardpolitics.com/covers/the-new-space-race/; see also Thomas Heath, Space-Mining May 
Be Only a Decade Away. Really., WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/space-mining-may-be-only-a-decade-away-really/2017/
04/28/df33b31a-29ee-11e7-a616-d7c8a68c1a66_story.html?utm_term=.bc9e52036305. 
 27. Heath, supra note 26. The “space population” referred to in this article includes 
space travelers—tourists and scientists—as well as satellite companies. See id. 
 28. SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic are among the best-known companies 
that seek to send people into space. See generally Monica Grady, Private Companies Are 
Launching A New Space Race – Here’s What To Expect, PHYS.ORG: CONVERSATION (Oct. 3, 
2017), https://phys.org/news/2017-10-private-companies-space.html. Satellite companies like  
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Sovereign governments continue to play a significant, albeit declining, 
role in the space economy. NASA’s share of the national budget decreased 
from 4.4% in 1966 to 0.5% in 2014.30 Its current strategy centers on partner-
ship with the private space economy: “NASA helps mitigate financial risk, 
while the private sector conducts research and innovation more efficiently 
than NASA can . . . .”31 Similarly Luxembourg, which lacks its own space 
agency,32 opened a 200 million Euro fund in 2016 to bring asteroid mining 
companies to the country.33 Planetary Resources has availed itself of oppor-
tunities offered by both NASA and Luxembourg, performing contract work 
with the former and securing funding from the latter.34 
While sovereign governments do hold some of the purse strings rele-
vant to asteroid mining companies and the space economy as a whole, pri-
vate companies are increasingly displacing national space agencies.35 A pri-
Société Européenne des Satellites, based in Luxembourg, also require launch services to place 
their devices into orbit and could thus benefit from reduced launch costs. See Dana Hull, 
SpaceX Launches Satellite for SES in Its 11th Mission This Year, BLOOMBERG (June 4, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-04/spacex-launches-satellite-for-ses-in-
its-11th-mission-this-year. 
 29. Asteroid Mining Is The Key To Our Future Expansion Into Space, PLANETARY 
RESOURCES (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.planetaryresources.com/2017/11/asteroid-mining-
is-the-key-to-our-future-expansion-into-space/ (noting that “Earth’s gravity well is so deep 
that the cost of bringing propellant from Earth to fuel that economy in space will be prohibi-
tive.”). 
 30. Lossner, supra note 26. In the 2019 fiscal year, NASA received 0.4% of the total 
federal budget. Kimberly Amadeo, NASA Budget, Current Funding, History, and Economic 
Impact, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/nasa-budget-current-funding-and-history-
3306321 (last updated Sept. 7, 2018). 
 31. Lossner, supra note 26. 
 32. Aerospace Industry, GRAND DUCHY LUX., http://www.luxembourg.public.lu/en/
investir/secteurs-cles/industrie-aerospatiale/index.html (last updated Mar. 21, 2018). 
 33. Approximately $227 million US. David Z. Morris, Luxembourg to Invest $227 Mil-
lion in Asteroid Mining, FORTUNE (June 5, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/05/luxembourg-
asteroid-mining. 
 34. See David Coldeway, Planetary Resources Mines Luxembourg for $28M in Aster-
oid Hunting Funds, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 3, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/11/03/
planetary-resources-mines-luxembourg-for-28m-in-asteroid-hunting-funds; Planetary Re-
sources Moves Closer to Mining Asteroids, PLANETARY RESOURCES (July 15, 2015), https://
www.planetaryresources.com/2015/07/planetary-resources-moves-closer-to-mining-asteroids. 
 35. See, e.g., Loren Grush, How the Private Space Industry Could Take Over Lower 
Earth Orbit—and Make Money Off It, VERGE (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/
2018/2/16/17014176/nasa-iss-commercial-space-industry-budget-2025-privatization (“NASA 
hopes to transition the domain of lower Earth orbit . . . to the commercial space industry over 
the next seven years.”); Sintia Radu, The Global Race to Space, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2018-08-27/60-years-
after-nasa-a-global-space-race (noting that “experts say the future of space activity may rest 
with private corporations . . . .”); Alan Yuhas, The New Space Race: How Billionaires 
Launched the Next Era of Exploration, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2018), https://
www.theguardian.com/science/2018/feb/09/new-space-race-billionaires-elon-musk-jeff-bezos  
 
Fall 2018] Space, the Final Frontier of Enterprise 195 
vate space economy that is increasingly independent from sovereign gov-
ernments tends to undermine the factual framework upon which the original 
OST relied.36 Specifically, Article VI assigns responsibility for non-
governmental entities to national governments, the implicit assumption like-
ly being that private entities would be acting at the behest of a sovereign.37 
This concern is increasingly unsubstantiated in an environment in which 
private, independent companies are ascendant.38 
C. Global Benefits of Asteroid Mining 
Asteroid mining has the potential to facilitate space travel, an outcome 
the OST holds to be in the interest of humanity as a whole.39 The potential 
of asteroid mining to reduce the cost of spaceflight, moreover, could facili-
tate the growth of the space economy. Asteroid mining thus aligns with an-
other stated purposes of the OST in the sense that an expanded space econ-
omy could provide substantial benefits to all mankind.40 First, in seeking to 
face the challenges posed by space travel, the public sector space race gave 
rise to numerous technological innovations, ranging from LEDs to emer-
gency blankets to memory foam.41 It seems likely that the private space race 
would result in a similar degree of innovation, the products of which could 
benefit people across the globe. 
Second, a successful mission to Mars could provide benefits beyond a 
mere sense of interplanetary accomplishment. NASA suggests that, given 
the parallels between the formation and evolution of Mars and Earth, a voy-
age there could help “us learn more about our own planet’s history and fu-
ture.”42 The scientific advancements from such a mission cannot currently 
(quoting Jeff Manber, CEO of the space company Nanoracks: “We’re finally reaching the 
point where there’s a robust marketplace . . . . It won’t just be on the one pillar of government-
organized or government-funded.”). 
 36. See Jason Krause, The Outer Space Treaty Turns 50: Can It Survive a New Space 
Race?, ABA J., Apr. 2017, at 44 (noting that the OST is a “product of the Cold War and pri-
marily addresses concerns of that era, including nuclear war[,]” and that at that time “only the 
United States and Soviet Union were even capable of launching vehicles into space . . . .”). 
 37. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6. 
 38. See articles cited supra note 35. 
 39. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at pmbl. (“[T]he common interest of all 
mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purpos-
es . . . .”). 
 40. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at pmbl. 
 41. Jet Propulsion Laboratory, NASA, https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/infographics/
infographic.view.php?id=11358. 
 42. NASA’s Journey to Mars, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/content/nasas-journey-to-
mars (last updated Aug. 7, 2017).  
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be anticipated and are difficult to predict, but “expand[ing] the frontiers of 
knowledge” in this manner could well bring benefits to all mankind.43 
Third, the development of asteroid mining technology could also help 
advance asteroid diversion tactics. The development of the technology re-
quired to conduct successful asteroid mining operations could “help us to 
divert any incoming asteroids.”44 This is of great importance since NASA 
recently eliminated its Asteroid Redirect Mission due to funding cuts;45 
NASA’s project was hailed by some scientists as a “critical step in demon-
strating we can protect our planet from a future asteroid impact . . . .”46 As-
teroid mining could step in and fill an important void. While the probability 
of an Armageddon-causing impact is low, the effects of an impact would be 
extremely severe.47 Even some mitigation of this risk as a byproduct of as-
teroid mining would be a benefit to humanity as a whole. 
Finally, reduced launch costs could facilitate measures to combat global 
climate change. One proposed solution for canceling out predicted increases 
in average worldwide temperature is to “prevent[] . . . about 1% of incoming 
solar radiation—insolation—from reaching the Earth. This could be done by 
scattering into space from the vicinity of Earth an appropriately small frac-
tion of total insolation.”48 Asteroid mining could facilitate such measures in 
that “[t]echnologies that could greatly decrease the cost of space-launch 
 43. NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., FY 2017: AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT, at 
20 (2017). 
 44. Ian Sample, Asteroid Mining: US Company Looks to Space for Precious Metal, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2013, 2:40), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/jan/22/space-
mining-gold-asteroids. The Keck study, supra note 5, at 11–12, states the synergies asteroid 
mining would have with planetary defense as 1) developing “reliable robotic anchoring capa-
bility[,]” 2) “structural characterization, especially of the surface layers[,]” 3) understanding 
the “dust environment[,]” and 4) “[t]echniques for proximity operations and NEO [near-Earth 
object] navigation . . . .” 
 45. Jeff Foust, NASA Closing Out Asteroid Redirect Mission, SPACENEWS (June 14, 
2017), http://spacenews.com/nasa-closing-out-asteroid-redirect-mission. 
 46. Geoff Brown, NASA Plans to Test Asteroid Deflection Technique Designed to Pre-
sent Earth Impact, PHYS.ORG (July 4, 2017), https://phys.org/news/2017-07-nasa-asteroid-
deflection-technique-earth.html (referring to the Double Asteroid Redirection Test program, a 
part of the Asteroid Redirection Mission). 
 47. See Milton Kazmayer, Long Term Effects of an Asteroid Impact on Earth, SEATTLE 
PI, https://education.seattlepi.com/long-term-effects-asteroid-impact-earth-4601.html (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2018) (“A massive asteroid impact would create long-term changes in the 
atmosphere and climate of the planet. Upon impact, vaporized dirt and rock would fill the at-
mosphere, blocking sunlight and creating a state of near-permanent darkness and winter-like 
conditions . . . . [A] large asteroid, one at least five kilometers in diameter, could cause 
enough damage to threaten life on this planet.”). 
 48. EDWARD TELLER ET AL., GLOBAL WARMING AND ICE AGES: I. PROSPECTS FOR 
PHYSICS-BASED MODULATION OF GLOBAL CHANGE 2 (1997). In other words, this method 
proposes reflecting incoming sunlight back into space by sending material from Earth into 
orbit to block that sunlight, thus reducing the incoming amount of heat that would warm the 
Earth’s surface.  
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could make a telling difference in the practicality of all types of space-
deployed scattering systems of scales appropriate to insolation modula-
tion.”49 There are certainly intermediate measures to combat climate change 
that ought to be taken first, but asteroid mining would facilitate this expedit-
ed solution. While some of the benefits of asteroid mining would doubtless 
accrue primarily to those nations with asteroid mining companies within 
their borders, the benefits noted in this section—space exploration as a gen-
eral proposition, technological and scientific development, improvement of 
asteroid diversion technology, and facilitated means of swiftly countering 
climate change—would inure substantially to the benefit of all mankind. 
II. The Legal Ambiguities of the Outer Space Treaty 
The emergence of asteroid mining as a feasible business possibility pre-
sents a legal question: whether asteroid mining by private companies is le-
gal under the OST, which prohibits “national appropriation . . . by means of 
use or occupation” of “celestial bodies . . . .”50 The United States endorsed 
the view that asteroid mining is legal under existing international law 
through the passage of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness 
Act of 2015.51 Luxembourg similarly sanctioned asteroid mining with its 
own legislation.52 On the other hand, Russia and Brazil are both of the opin-
ion that asteroid mining “constitute[s] de facto national appropriation[,]” in 
violation of the OST.53 
 49. See id. at 7. 
 50. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2. 
 51. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, § 402(a) 
129 Stat. 704, 721 (2015) (“A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an 
asteroid resource or a space resource . . . shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space 
resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or 
space resource obtained according to applicable law, including the international obligations of 
the United States.”). The bill subsequently states, “It is the sense of Congress that by the en-
actment of this Act, the United States does not assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive 
rights or jurisdiction over, or ownership of, any celestial body.” § 403, 129 Stat. at 722. 
 52. See Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de 
l’espace [Law of July 20, 2017 on the exploration and utilization of space resources], 
MÉMORIAL A N° 674 DE 2017 (enacted July 28, 2017) (Lux.). 
The authoritative French version begins by stating “Les ressources de l’espace sont suscepti-
bles d’appropriation,” or in English, “Space resources are capable of being appropriated.” It 
goes on to state that “L’exploitant agréé ne peut exercer l’activité . . . qu’en conformité 
avec . . . les obligations internationales du Luxembourg,” which is a mandate that the operator 
may only perform the activity “in accordance with the international obligations of Luxem-
bourg.” This highlights an interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty that appropriation of space 
resources is not in violation of international law. 
 53. Kyle Evanoff, The Outer Space Treaty’s Midlife Funk, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.: 
INTERNATIONALIST (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/blog/outer-space-treatys-midlife-
funk; see also Mark Kaufman, Luxembourg’s Asteroid Mining is Legal Says Space Law Ex- 
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Article II of the OST states, “Outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sover-
eignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”54 The treaty 
further provides that individual countries “shall bear international responsi-
bility for national activities in outer space . . . whether such activities are 
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities” and 
must further “assur[e] that national activities are carried out in conformity 
with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.”55 Taken together, these 
provisions provide the textual basis for arguing that asteroid mining by pri-
vate companies is either permissible under or in violation of the OST. 
International law provides an interpretive framework relevant for an-
swering this question that places emphasis on the purpose of treaties. The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the “Vienna Convention”) pro-
vides principles for the interpretation of treaties. For the purposes of aster-
oid mining, the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention and is 
thus not bound by its terms; nevertheless, the United States “considers many 
of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to consti-
tute customary international law on the law of treaties.”56 The Vienna Con-
vention itself provides the following guidance to those interpreting treaties: 
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose.”57 International law states an interpretive 
method that, while starting with ordinary meaning, explicitly sanctions con-
sideration of the framers’ purpose. 
A literal textual interpretation of the treaty’s ordinary meaning suggests 
its terms prohibit asteroid mining. However, purposive arguments—
particularly given the nature of asteroid mining as a business that tends to 
facilitate space travel and exploration—generally point to an interpretation 
that grants permission to private companies to mine asteroids. 
pert, INVERSE (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.inverse.com/article/34935-luxembourg-s-asteroid-
mining-is-legal-says-space-law-expert (noting the explanation of the Russian and Brazilian 
point of view on asteroid mining by space law expert Frans von der Dunk, that these countries 
“don’t view these mining operations as meeting the non-ownership standards of the Outer 
Space Treaty . . . .”). 
 54. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2. 
 55. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6. 
 56. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T ST., https://www.state.gov/
s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm. 
 57. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331.  
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A. Textual Interpretation Prohibiting Asteroid Mining  
Under the Outer Space Treaty 
A private asteroid mining company most likely qualifies as a non-
governmental entity under the OST and is thus bound by the prohibitions 
stated in Article II.58 Article VI of the OST, as noted above, mandates that 
“States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for na-
tional activities in outer space . . . whether such activities are carried on by 
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities . . . .”59 A prelimi-
nary question to answer before assessing whether the prohibitions stated in 
Article II preclude asteroid mining is whether a private asteroid mining 
company would fall within this category specified in Article VI. Based on 
the plain meaning of the treaty, as well as the potential for circumvention of 
the terms of the treaty under an alternate interpretation discussed below, the 
answer is likely yes. 
To begin, a private company literally meets the plain meaning defini-
tion of “non-governmental entity” as an entity that is not the government. If 
not a private company, what non-governmental entity capable of spaceflight 
could the framers of the OST have had in mind?60 Moreover, an alternative 
interpretation could open the door to unscrupulous government circumven-
tion of the treaty, allowing nations to dodge responsibility under interna-
tional law by forming shell corporations and then freely engaging in activi-
ties otherwise prohibited by Article II.61 Even assuming the private entities 
engaging in asteroid mining were truly private, they would remain under the 
“authorization and continuing supervision” of the government under whose 
laws they are incorporated.62 Numerous academic commentators have point-
ed out that “[s]tates are unable to authorize their non-governmental entities 
to conduct activities that international law prohibits the state, itself, from 
conducting.”63 The actions of private space companies, then, must create 
 58. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2 (prohibiting “national appropriation by 
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”). 
 59. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6. 
 60. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6. 
 61. See Ricky J. Lee, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty: Prohibition of State Sover-
eignty, Private Property Rights, or Both?, 11 AUSTL. INT’L L.J. 128, 130 (2004) (noting that 
Article II must have at least some application to private entities, or else “it may be possible for 
States to circumvent the prohibitions contained in the Outer Space Treaty simply by ‘privatis-
ing’ the contravening activity.”). 
 62. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 6. 
 63. Leslie I. Tennen, Enterprise Rights and the Legal Regime for Exploitation of Outer 
Space Resources, 47 U. PAC. L. REV. 281, 287 (2016); see also C. WILFRED JENKS, SPACE 
LAW 201 (1965) (stating that “what is forbidden to a State is not permitted to a chartered com-
pany created by a State or to one of its nationals acting as a private adventurer . . . .”).  
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“international responsibility” for sovereign parties to the treaty; a violation 
of terms by the former is a violation by the latter.64 
Having determined that the prohibitions in Article II likely apply to pri-
vate companies, the next question is whether asteroid mining is a prohibited 
means of “national appropriation [of a celestial body] by claim of sover-
eignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” First, it 
seems far more likely than not that asteroids fall within the scope of celes-
tial bodies defined by this treaty. The Oxford Living Dictionary defines “ce-
lestial” as “[p]ositioned in or relating to the sky, or outer space as observed 
in astronomy.”65 This points to a rather all-encompassing definition that 
would seem to include all bodies beyond the terrestrial scope of Earth capa-
ble of astronomical observation and study; asteroids are plainly bodies of 
matter in space that are observable from Earth. 
The treaty uses the phrase “the moon and other celestial bodies,”66 
which might support an ejusdem generis inference that the celestial bodies 
envisioned by the treaty must be moon-like; that is to say, a celestial body 
must be very large and in predictable orbit around a planet or star, including 
planets and moons, but excluding asteroids and comets. However, this more 
exclusive definition would create a celestial line-drawing dilemma given 
that asteroids can become moons67 and asteroids can have their own 
moons.68 This difficulty, coupled with the broad definition of “celestial,” 
points to a broad definition of “celestial body” that includes asteroids. 
The crux of the question, then, is whether asteroid mining as an activity 
constitutes “national appropriation . . . by means of use or occupa-
tion . . . .”69 To “appropriate” something means to “take exclusive posses-
sion of,”70 or to “[t]ake (something) for one’s own use . . . .”71 In the case of 
 64. But see Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37 
FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 351 (1969) (suggesting that the treaty “appears to contain no prohibi-
tion regarding individual appropriation or acquisition by a private association . . . .”); see also 
Wayne N. White, Jr., Real Property Rights in Outer Space, PROC. 40 COLLOQUIUM ON L. 
OUTER SPACE 370 (1998) (arguing that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits territori-
al sovereignty but does not prohibit private appropriation). 
 65. Celestial, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES: ENG., https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/celestial (last visted Nov. 28, 2018); see also Celestial, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/celestial (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2018) (“of or relating to the sky of visible heavens”). 
 66. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2. 
 67. See Mars Moons, NASA, https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/moons/mars-moons/in-depth 
(last updated Mar. 29, 2018) (noting that the moons of Mars, Phobos and Deimos, “may be 
captured asteroids.”). 
 68. See 243 Ida, NASA, https://solarsystem.nasa.gov/small-bodies/asteroids/243-ida/
in-depth (last updated Dec. 5, 2017) (noting that Ida is the first asteroid found to have its own 
moon). 
 69. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2. 
 70. Appropriate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/appropriate#h2 (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).  
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the OST, “national” modifies “appropriation[,]” illustrating that exclusive 
use of celestial objects that is sovereign in nature constitutes a violation of 
the treaty.72 A plain reading of the text of Article II indicates that “use or 
occupation” is one avenue through which a country can engage in national 
appropriation and, due to Article VI, that use or occupation can be the prod-
uct of a private company’s actions.73 
The passage of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness 
Act endorses an interpretation that extraction of space resources by com-
mercial actors is a use that does not amount to a claim of sovereignty, ab-
sent a claim of sovereignty by the actor’s host nation.74 Congress stated in 
the Act that, “by enactment . . . the United States does not thereby assert 
sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over . . . any ce-
lestial body.”75 In making this disclaimer, Congress treated making a claim 
of sovereignty as a necessary component of achieving national appropria-
tion of a celestial body. It gave private actors permission to exploit celestial 
resources, subject to the authorization and supervision of the federal gov-
ernment, “in accordance with the international obligations of the United 
States,” while disclaiming that this amounted to a claim of sovereignty or 
jurisdiction.76 In other words, Congress effectively interpreted the OST to 
prohibit only national appropriation by claim of sovereignty and by use or 
occupation, an interpretation it understands to be in conformity with interna-
tional law. 
 71. Appropriate, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES: ENG., https://
en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/appropriate (last visited Nov. 28, 2018). 
 72. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2. 
 73. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, arts. 2, 6. 
 74. The passage of this Act may in and of itself constitute a violation of the Outer 
Space Treaty: the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally Wrongful Acts 
states, “There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is 
not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or 
character.” Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10, at 54 (2001). The commentary to this Article states that “[c]ertain obligations may 
be breached by the mere passage of incompatible legislation.” Id. at 57. On the other hand, 
given circumstances in which “it is open to the State concerned to give effect to the legislation 
in a way which would not violate the international obligation in question[,]” then “whether 
there is a breach will depend on whether and how the legislation is given effect.” Id. In this 
case, the Act at least pays lip service to conformity with international obligations when it dis-
claims that it is an assertion of sovereignty: it states that Congress did not understand this Act 
to amount to “sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or ownership 
of, any celestial body.” U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 
114-90, § 403 129 Stat. 704, 722 (2015). This disclaimer may well place this Act in the latter 
category envisioned by the commentary to the Draft Articles, that the violation depends on 
how the Act is given effect. This in turn requires a more thorough reading of the Treaty itself. 
 75. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, § 403. 
 76. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, § 403.  
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The more persuasive textual interpretation of Article II of the OST 
points toward the opposite conclusion. The disjunctive nature of Article II 
suggests that national appropriation can occur either by “claim of sovereign-
ty,” or by “use or occupation . . . .”77 Under this interpretation, a private 
company could certainly violate the terms of the OST through use or occu-
pation of a celestial body. 
The counterargument to this interpretation is based more on experience 
with the treaty than the terms of the document itself. First, some use or oc-
cupation of celestial bodies, whether by sovereign governments or by pri-
vate industry, has not been legally contested over the course of the OST’s 
existence. The United States, the U.S.S.R., and China have all “soft-landed” 
on the moon, placing astronauts or lunar rovers on the surface, thus occupy-
ing, if only temporarily, the surface of a celestial body specifically enumer-
ated by the OST.78 
Moreover, as noted in the House Report prior to passing the Commer-
cial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, “[t]he United States, Russia, and 
Japan have all removed, taken possession, and used in-situ natural re-
sources. These activities have never been protested by a State party to the 
treaty or judged in a court of law to be in violation of the Outer Space Trea-
ty.”79 The OST, by its own terms, condones some use of celestial bodies by 
sovereign governments. Article IV states, “[t]he moon and other celestial 
bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peace-
ful purposes.”80 While military use of space and celestial objects is clearly 
verboten, the implication of this provision is permission for peaceful use. It 
is certainly accurate that the “use or occupation” of a celestial body has not 
previously amounted to a per se violation of the treaty. The argument that 
asteroid mining does not violate the OST, then, seems to be that use or oc-
cupation alone is not enough; violation requires an additional claim of sov-
ereignty. 
However, a lack of prior implementation or legal enforcement does not 
foreclose the interpretation that some kinds of use or occupation by a private 
actor could amount to violation of the treaty, even absent the assertion of 
sovereignty or jurisdiction. Moreover, given the history of partnerships be-
tween the commercial space sector and sovereign governments,81 an inter-
pretation making a claim of sovereignty necessary to national appropriation 
by private use creates a loophole large enough to swallow all the prohibi-
 77. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 2. 
 78. Connor Simpson, China Becomes Third Country to Ever ‘Soft-Land’ on the Moon, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 14, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/china-
becomes-third-country-ever-soft-land-moon/356151/. 
 79. H.R. REP. NO. 114-153, at 8 (2015). 
 80. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 4. 
 81. See supra Section I(b) (noting the history of financial partnerships between private 
space companies and sovereign governments).  
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tions stated in the OST. For example, the colonization of Mars by a private 
company is an action that would likely violate the treaty as it currently 
stands in that it would almost by definition require exclusive possession of a 
celestial body that is meant to be the “province of all mankind.”82 However, 
were colonization not accompanied by the explicit assertion of national sov-
ereignty or jurisdiction, it would be permissible under the U.S. interpreta-
tion of the OST. 
The degree of occupation and use also might well exceed previous ex-
amples in the history of the OST. Asteroid mining is perhaps a more fleeting 
occupation than a permanent colony, but if the asteroid mining industry be-
comes a fully mobilized component of the new space economy, the degree 
of extraction and use would far exceed the scattered lunar samples in terms 
of volume, making those a tenuous precedent upon which to rely. These ar-
guments based on experience with the OST do not rely on the terms of the 
treaty anyway. Focusing on the plain meaning of the text, asteroid mining 
by a private company, even if unaccompanied by a claim of sovereignty, vi-
olates the OST. 
B. Asteroid Mining is in Line with the Purposes of the  
Outer Space Treaty 
Despite the preceding plain text reading, asteroid mining by private 
companies squares with the purposes of the OST.83 A major purpose of the 
treaty is to maintain the international character of space, to ensure that the 
vast realm beyond Earth’s atmosphere remains “the province of all man-
kind[,]” and that the benefits of space exploration flow to all states “irre-
spective of their degree of economic or scientific development . . . .”84 This 
Note argues that asteroid mining is an enterprise that is in the interest of all 
mankind and brings benefits to all nations regardless of their current state of 
development. 
Commercial asteroid mining is private, profit-driven in character, and 
arguably distinguishable from the more wholly scientific objectives of sov-
 82. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 1. For more detailed explanation as to why a 
Mars colony would likely violate the Outer Space Treaty, see Michael J. Listner, A Legal 
Look at Elon Musk’s Plan to Colonize Mars, SPACE REV. (July 17, 2017), http://
www.thespacereview.com/article/3286/1; Caroline Haskins, The Legal Battle to Colonize 
Mars, OUTLINE (Mar. 15, 2018), https://theoutline.com/post/3739/mars-colony-settlement-
spacex-elon-musk-trump?zd=1&zi=mmhbqxps. 
 83. The Vienna Convention, Article 31, explicitly sanctions the consideration of the 
purpose of a treaty in the interpretation of the document—this seemingly condones purposive 
interpretation in a way that is arguably more out of vogue in the American judiciary. Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 57, art. 31. 
 84. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 1.  
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ereign space agencies like NASA.85 However, given the waning funding for 
and role of sovereign space agencies,86 the development of the asteroid min-
ing industry could deliver important benefits to all mankind that simply may 
not otherwise come into existence. Asteroid mining could contribute to the 
common good by producing benefits that have global effect, as they pertain 
to the survival of the human species. These include enhanced asteroid diver-
sion capability87 and facilitation of climate change mitigation measures.88 
Advancements in technology to address the challenges of asteroid mining 
and improving our collective scientific understanding of the universe could 
bring as yet unknown benefits to all humanity.89 Finally, by reducing costs 
of launch, asteroid mining could effectively open the door to the space 
economy to nations that might otherwise find this prospect cost-
prohibitive.90 
The purposive arguments presented above in favor of the permissibility 
of asteroid mining are not immune to criticism. The United States, Luxem-
bourg, and whatever other nations are able to attract asteroid mining com-
panies in the future would benefit disproportionately from asteroid mining 
in the form of taxable corporate income and job creation. For the roughly 
99% of countries currently without asteroid mining companies within their 
borders, there would be no share of those benefits, which are effectively be-
ing extracted from a space that is meant to be the “province of all man-
kind.”91 Moreover, given that spaceflight is currently the exclusive province 
of a few wealthy, industrialized nations, there is at least an argument to be 
made that asteroid mining may accelerate the gap between the first and third 
world rather than act as a rising tide that lifts all ships. 
However, an argument that disproportionate benefit makes asteroid 
mining at odds with the purpose of the OST misunderstands the treaty and 
overlooks the nature of the benefits asteroid mining could deliver. First, the 
OST endorses the view that human space travel and exploration, as a gen-
 85. See NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., supra note 43, at 6 (stating agency 
objectives). 
 86. See Lossner, supra note 26; see also Marina Koren, NASA’s Next Frontier is Wash-
ington, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.govexec.com/technology/2017/02/
nasas-next-frontier-washington/135553/. 
 87. See KECK INST. FOR SPACE STUDIES , supra note 5, at 11–12 (describing how as-
teroid mining would enhance asteroid diversion capabilities). 
 88. See TELLER ET AL., supra note 48, at 7 (noting that technology decreasing the cost 
of launch would facilitate solar insolation modulation). 
 89. See supra Section I(c). 
 90. See supra Section I(a). for why asteroid mining reduces cost of launch. Moreover, 
this growth of the “space population” is in the interest of asteroid mining companies since that 
is their future market for in-space materials. See Heath, supra note 26. 
 91. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. 1.  
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eral proposition, is in the interest of humanity.92 Asteroid mining would fa-
cilitate space travel by reducing launch costs and would do so in an indis-
criminate manner—assuming private asteroid mining companies are able to 
sell propellant to entities from all nations, as would surely be in their best 
interest.93 
Second, while the financial fruits of the endeavor may reflect preexist-
ing terrestrial inequality, many benefits of asteroid mining would, by defini-
tion, extend to all mankind.94 The OST does not demand that all benefits de-
rived from outer space be shared equally across nations, but rather that outer 
space activity “should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespec-
tive of the degree of their economic or scientific development . . . .”95 Im-
proved asteroid diversion technology and facilitation of climate change mit-
igation measures provide benefits pertaining to the continued habitability of 
Earth that are spread evenly across the globe.96 Scientific and technological 
developments,97 depending on their content, could eventually flow to all na-
tions by way of sale through global markets. Because asteroid mining could 
simultaneously facilitate space travel and bring substantial benefits to all 
mankind—notwithstanding an uneven distribution of those benefits—it is in 
harmony with the stated objectives of the OST. 
III. A New International Framework to  
Govern the Space Economy 
Asteroid mining creates tension within the OST as an activity that is 
prohibited by the treaty’s terms but largely in line with the treaty’s purpose. 
As such, the OST should be modified to allow for greater certainty and pre-
dictability with respect to asteroid mining. The possibility that asteroid min-
ing could be illegal under international law likely disincentivizes entry into 
this new endeavor by adding risk and uncertainty. This section outlines what 
a revised framework should look like. First, the law governing space should 
remain international in nature to further the interests of peaceful cooperation 
and facilitate dispute resolution. Second, this framework should present 
minimal regulatory barriers for entry given the benefits that asteroid mining 
could bring to all mankind. The development of whaling law provides a use-
 92. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, pmbl. (recognizing “the common interest of 
all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purpos-
es . . . .”). 
 93. See supra Section I(c). 
 94. See supra Section I(c). 
 95. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, pmbl. 
 96. See KECK INST. FOR SPACE STUDIES, supra note 5, at 11–12 (noting that asteroid 
mining could have a possible effect on asteroid diversion technology); TELLER, supra note 50, 
at 7 (stating that reducing cost of launch could facilitate solar insolation management). 
 97. See NASA’s Journey to Mars, supra note 42.  
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ful historical example of how norms and rules for the asteroid mining indus-
try could evolve in a way that facilitates efficient governance of this en-
deavor.
A. The Desirability of an International Framework
The preservation of space as a zone governed by international law, in 
contrast to a system predicated on national jurisdiction, is desirable in that it 
promotes peace, facilitates dispute resolution, and allows for more coordi-
nated efforts in addressing issues relevant to all entities operating in space.98
As illustrated by the recent legislative activity in the United States and Lux-
embourg, the risk of inaction is the resultant domination of the extraterres-
trial environment by individual nations rather than by international agree-
ment.99 It would take only minor changes to the OST to resolve some of the 
ambiguities in the status quo and help bring the benefits of asteroid mining 
to humanity as a whole. A revision of this treaty rather than a wholesale 
abandonment of the agreement—whether that abandonment is in fact or 
merely in practice—would better maintain the international character of 
space.
The OST reflects Cold War era concerns about the militarization of 
space.100 Private companies, now ascendant in the growing space economy, 
simply do not have the military capacity or intention of sovereign govern-
ments. In short, the factual backdrop for the signing of the OST has 
changed. One straightforward means of authorizing private companies to 
extract space resources would be to revise the OST to clarify that the lan-
guage in Article II prohibiting national appropriation does not apply to pri-
vate companies. This could be achieved by simply adding a sentence to the 
end of Article VI: Under the revised treaty, companies shall remain under 
the supervision of the countries in which they are based but are not capable 
of national appropriation by use or occupation. This revision would create 
something of a line-drawing problem given the partnerships between sover-
eign space agencies and private companies,101 as well as a possible loophole 
by which unscrupulous nations could take advantage of the corporate form. 
Additional safeguards might be necessary to prevent this possibility. This 
revision could, however, promote peaceful coexistence and uniformity in 
space law, as well as create certainty as to the legality of asteroid mining by 
private companies.
98. The OST, supra note 9, espouses many of these ideals in the preamble.
99. The passage of the U.S. Space Launch and Competitiveness Act and the Loi de 20 
julliet 2017 illustrate that given lack of international consensus, there is a risk that individuals 
nations will act unilaterally in accord with the interpretation of the OST most favorable to 
their interests. For more on the enactment of these laws, see supra notes 51–52.
100. Not only military activity, but the nuclear arms race specifically helped prompt the 
signing of the OST. See Krause, supra note 36, at 46; Grush, supra note 8.
101. See supra Section I(b).
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Another possibility is to create a new set of international rules for ex-
traction of space resources. Assignment of such property rights could take 
the form of a first-come, first-served system102 or it could depend on an 
Earth-side registration process.103 Arguably, extraction is different than the 
forbidden uses enumerated in the OST in that it is a temporary occupation 
and not inherently an exercise of military might or the flexing of sovereign 
muscle.104 While the United States and Luxembourg both interpret asteroid 
mining to be legal under the existing treaty,105 the promulgation of rules 
governing the endeavor would add clarity as to the legality of the enterprise. 
This approach would have the advantage of treating sovereign actors and 
private companies alike, but would require more substantial revision of the 
OST, or a new international agreement altogether. 
An amended OST or a new treaty governing the extraction of space re-
sources would have the benefit of maintaining the peaceful order of space. 
While admittedly the product of a different era, the post-national and peace-
able foundation of the OST is still desirable in an international environment 
where many nations are armed to the proverbial nuclear teeth. Peaceful use 
of outer space is a laudable objective and one served most effectively by in-
ternational agreement rather than by competing national claims of sover-
eignty.106 
An international system would also facilitate dispute resolution. In a 
borderless and extra-jurisdictional realm like outer space, a system predicat-
ed on national sovereignty and ownership is not instructive as to whose 
 102. Wayne White, Proposal for a Multilateral Treaty Regarding Jurisdiction and Real 
Property Rights in Outer Space, SPACE FUTURE (2001),  
http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/proposal_for_a_multilateral_treaty_regarding_
jurisdiction_and_real_property_rights_in_outer_space.shtml (“Entities may occupy and use 
locations in outer space on a first-come, first-served basis, so long as said occupation and use 
will not interfere with other entities [sic] activities.”). 
 103. Alison Morris, Note, Intergalactic Property Law: A New Regime for a New Age, 19 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1085, 1112 (2017). 
 104. In Article 4, the Outer Space Treaty forbids “establishment of military bases, instal-
lations and fortifications . . . .” See articles cited supra note 82 for a more detailed explanation 
as to why a permanent government-sponsored colony would violate art. 2 of the Outer Space 
Treaty. 
 105. The language used in these laws, suggests that the legislative bodies of both coun-
tries interpreted the laws being passed as in conformity with international law. See supra 
notes 51–52 for more discussion of the specific language these laws used to indicate their con-
formity with international law. 
 106. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Antarctic Treaty, both examples of 
treaties governing areas outside of the jurisdictional reach of any sovereign, emphasize the 
fundamental importance of peaceful use. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea pmbl., 
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (stating the desirability of a treaty that 
will “promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans . . . .”); Antarctic Treaty pmbl., Dec. 1, 
1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71 (noting the objective that Antarctica “shall not become 
the scene or object of international discord . . . .”).  
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laws—or whose choice of law rules—would control in the event of disputed 
title of an asteroid or the commission of a tort between two actors from dif-
ferent nations.107 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the 
“UNCLOS”) established the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(the “ITLOS”) as a means of providing a venue in which similar disputes 
could be adjudicated between actors with conflicting legal regimes.108 Outer 
space has a great deal of similarity to the high seas: both are vast, both are 
easily treated as a non-appropriable international commons, and both are an 
in-between space in the sense of existing between bodies of terra firma.109 
An international mechanism like ITLOS ought to be established for resolv-
ing space disputes such that parties can seek a neutral arbiter to resolve con-
flict and laws can be uniformly applied to all entities irrespective of their 
country of origin.110 
Finally, an international system could more easily allow for cooperation 
between nations and private entities in addressing issues that affect the 
spacefaring community as a whole. The emergence of space debris and the 
use of nuclear power sources in space are examples of developing issues 
that bear on the ease and safety of space travel for all.111 Left to national 
governments or individual corporations, it seems plausible that lack of over-
sight could result in a tragedy of the commons.112 By contrast, an interna-
 107. The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, is currently not instructive in this respect, 
either: it provides that states retain jurisdiction over their objects and personnel (art. 8), and 
that they are internationally liable for damage to another state party (art. 7). 
 108. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Seas, supra note 106, at Annex VI; see also 
Helmut Tuerk, The Contribution of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to Inter-
national Law, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 289 (2007). 
 109. See M.J. Peterson, The Use of Analogies in Developing Outer Space Law, 51 INT’L 
ORG 245, 252 (1997) (noting that the vastness and in-between quality of the seas and space 
made this analogy appealing); Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: 
The Case for a Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 363, 374 (2004) 
(noting that the decision to treat outer space as a nonappropriable international commons 
arose by analogy to the high seas). 
 110. ITLOS has been used relatively few times since coming into existence, leading 
some commentators to conclude that its effectiveness is limited. See Rosemary Rayfuse, The 
Future of Compulsory Dispute Settlement Under The Law of the Sea Convention, 36 VICT. U. 
WELLINGTON L. REV. 683, 709–10 (2005) (noting that ITLOS has heard relatively few cases, 
has proven to be “circumscribed in scope,” and that “if the past is prologue, the future does 
not look overly bright.”). On the other hand, other commentators have interpreted the brief 
history of ITLOS as supporting a more positive vision of the tribunal’s future, and that its 
mere existence has been a beneficial development. See Tuerk, supra note 108, at 316 (noting 
that the tribunal’s record “does not compare unfavourably to that of other international judi-
cial bodies in the initial stages of their existence[,]” and that “a choice of forum . . . is more 
beneficial than harmful . . . .”). 
 111. See David Tan, Towards a New Regime for the Protection of Outer Space as the 
“Province of All Mankind,” 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 145, 149–55 (2000). 
 112. See Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and Its Threat to National Security: A Pro-
posal for a Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L  
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tional framework is well-suited to consider the problems of the space eco-
system in a way that transcends national boundaries. The UNCLOS Pream-
ble, for example, demonstrates an awareness that “problems of ocean space 
are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole.”113 The com-
pelling interests of peace, uniformity, and cooperation in outer space illus-
trate the desirability of an international framework to govern asteroid min-
ing; to tweak rather than jettison the existing law. The resulting clarity and 
predictability would incentivize asteroid mining through reducing legal risk 
and uncertainty. 
A counterproposal to an international framework is a system in which 
nations assign property rights according to domestic law. It would be possi-
ble to take a terra nullius approach to property rights relating to celestial 
bodies.114 In the Western Sahara advisory opinion, the International Court of 
Justice defined terra nullius as “a legal term of art employed in connection 
with ‘occupation’ as one of the accepted legal methods of acquiring sover-
eignty over territory.”115 For a nation to peaceably acquire sovereignty 
through occupation, the land must be “terra nullius—a territory belonging 
to no-one—at the time of the act alleged to constitute the ‘occupation[.]’ ”116 
This legal approach was prevalent during the colonial era: explorers and 
emigrants acting in the name of European sovereigns declared ownership of 
territory by right of discovery and occupation.117 By authorizing U.S. citi-
zens to extract materials from asteroids through the Commercial Space 
Launch Competitiveness Act, the United States has started down a path in 
which property rights in space flow from the jurisdiction of individual sov-
L. 589, 592 (2011) (noting that “[w]ithout legal consequences, including appropriate interna-
tional sanctions for treaty violations, little international influence exists to compel space-
faring nations to find a viable solution to this problem.”). 
 113. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 106. 
 114. Numerous commentators have suggested that something along the lines of terra 
nullius, adverse possession, or right of first possession—all sounding in domestic law—ought 
to apply to celestial resources. See, e.g., Brandon C. Gruner, A New Hope for International 
Space Law: Incorporating Nineteenth Century First Possession Principles into the 1967 
Space Treaty for the Colonization of Outer Space in the Twenty-First Century, 35 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 299, 344–56 (2004); Lauren E. Shaw, Asteroids, the New Western Frontier: 
Applying Principles of the General Mining Law of 1872 to Incentivize Asteroid Mining, 78 J. 
AIR L. & COM. 121, 143–54 (2013). 
 115. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶ 79 (Oct. 16). 
 116. Id. (italicization in original). 
 117. See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823) (“[D]iscovery 
gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy . . . .”); Mabo v. Queens-
land [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, ¶ 33 (Austl.) (“International law recognized . . . occupation of 
territory that was terra nullius as [one] of the effective ways of acquiring sovereignty.”).  
 
210 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 40:189 
ereign nations.118 Luxembourg has taken a similar approach through its own 
legislation.119 
There are some notable advantages to this approach. The absence of an 
international policing or enforcement mechanism in space arguably points 
in favor of regulation by nations with spaceflight capacity. Given the gener-
ally acknowledged challenges of enforcing international law,120 one might 
wonder whether domestic governments might be better positioned to moni-
tor and control private entities based within their borders. A nation-centric 
approach would also likely incentivize investment in asteroid mining, 
prompting countries and private actors to invest more aggressively so as not 
to lose the new space race.121 Assuming, as this Note does, that the devel-
opment of the asteroid mining industry is in the interest of humanity as a 
whole, this approach has some appeal. 
However, a nation-centric, first possession framework has drawbacks 
that highlight the desirability of an international governance regime for as-
teroid mining. First, the experience of colonization was one that prompted 
conflict between colonizers.122 The peaceful character of space is one of the 
great achievements of the OST, and it should not be jettisoned. Second, a 
regime characterized by national actors could spark a race to the bottom 
with respect to domestic regulation, leading to the same “flags of conven-
ience” problem present in the maritime context as asteroid mining and 
spaceflight companies relocate to avoid taxes, labor and safety standards, 
and tort liability.123 An international framework, by contrast, could more 
 118. See U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 
114-90, 129 Stat. 704. 
 119. See Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de 
l’espace [Law of July 20, 2017 on the exploration and utilization of space resources], 
MÉMORIAL A N° 674 DE 2017 (enacted July 28, 2017) (Lux.). 
 120. See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Enforcing International Law, ASIL INSIGHTS, Jan. 22, 
1996, (providing an overview of challenges of enforcement of international law). 
 121. See Ross Myers, The Doctrine of Appropriation and Asteroid Mining: Incentivizing 
the Private Exploration and Development of Outer Space, 17 Or. Rev. Int’l L. 183, 185 
(2015) (suggesting that “the doctrine of appropriation, a modified version of the rule of cap-
ture, is a reasonable doctrine to incentivize the development of space. . .”). 
 122. Examples of wars touched off or exacerbated by colonial conflict include the War 
of the Spanish Succession, the French and Indian War, and, to some extent, World War I. See, 
e.g., HEW STRACHAN, THE FIRST WORLD WAR, VOLUME 1: TO ARMS 1–35 (2003) (discuss-
ing German Weltpolitik and the Moroccan crises as causes of World War I). 
 123. In the maritime context, the “flags of convenience” problem refers to the selection 
of a country of registry (or flag) based on the least burdensome tax and regulatory scheme. 
See Brian Baker, Flags of Convenience and the Gulf Oil Spill: Problems and Proposed Solu-
tions, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 687, 695 (2012) (noting the advantages of flags of convenience for 
owners of vessels as “(1) easy registration of maritime vessels, (2) lower taxes, (3) reduced 
operating expenses, and (4) freedom of control by the country of registry.”) (quoting Richard 
J. Payne, Flags of Convenience and Oil Pollution: A Threat to National Security, 3 HOUS. J. 
INT’L L. 67, 69 (1980)). The consequences of the flags of convenience problem in maritime  
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easily prevent this problem by facilitating the creation of uniform standards 
for labor, safety, and liability, making relocation to under-regulated states a 
less attractive prospect. The drawbacks of a system governed by individual 
nations, in conjunction with the advantages of a global system illustrated 
above, point to the desirability of a revised framework governing asteroid 
mining that is international in character. 
B.  A System with Minimal Regulatory Barriers to Entry 
Whatever approach is chosen to resolve the ambiguities in the OST 
ought not to be overly restrictive or create burdensome regulatory obstacles 
for private asteroid mining companies. Substantial regulation could discour-
age investment and hamper the development of an already capital-intensive 
and high-risk industry.124 The ideal regulatory system for asteroid mining 
should maintain an international character for the reasons described in the 
previous section but should not impose cumbersome regulation on asteroid 
mining companies at this stage in their development. Rather, allowing 
norms to develop over time through the resolution of disputes between as-
teroid mining companies would likely result in the most efficient regulatory 
system and would be more attractive to companies and nations that might be 
tempted to disregard the treaty. 
The development of whaling custom offers insight into the extent to 
which “property rights may arise anarchically out of social custom.”125 The 
analogy to asteroid mining is strong in that both are extractive, high-risk, 
and capital-intensive industries that take place in what is effectively mare 
liberum (free sea).126 Herman Melville in Moby-Dick suggests the whaling 
industry was not governed by a “formal whaling code,” but rather that the 
law include substandard working conditions, safety concerns, and difficulty assigning tort lia-
bility to individual owners of vessels. See H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships 
and Flags of Convenience: Economics, Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 
162–67 (1996). See also Matthew Schaefer, The Contours of Permissionless Innovation in the 
Outer Space Domain, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 103, 175 (2017) (noting that flags of convenience 
could prove to be a problem for the space economy). 
 124. See Kamil Muzyka, The Common Burden of “Spacemankind,” SPACE REV. (July 
10, 2017), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3279/1 (“Forcing . . . small space prospect-
ing companies into an unfavorable license and reaping huge royalties is not a best future for a 
developing new space industry.”). 
 125. Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from 
the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 83 (1989) [hereinafter Ellickson, Hypothesis]. 
For a more thorough discussion of this theory, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT 
LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991), 
 126. See generally HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREE SEA (David Armitage ed., Richard 
Hakluyt trans., Liberty Fund 2011) (1609) (arguing for freedom of navigation of the high seas 
as a global commons); see also Muzyka, supra note 124 (mentioning briefly whaling in con-
nection with asteroid mining).  
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“fishermen have been their own legislators and lawyers in this matter.”127
Over time, the custom developed that “I. A Fast-Fish belongs to the party 
fast to it [and] II. A Loose-Fish is fair game for anybody who can soonest 
catch it.”128 While Melville concedes that “the commentaries of the whale-
men themselves sometimes consist in hard words and harder knocks—the 
Coke-upon-Littleton of the fist,”129 he also notes that this code is “universal, 
undisputed law applicable to all cases”130 that prevents “vexatious and vio-
lent disputes [arising] between the fishermen.”131 By and large, whalers were 
able to govern themselves by crafting norms over time that suited their 
needs.
Robert Ellickson, in his Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms, cited 
the development of whaling norms as supporting the idea that, “when peo-
ple are situated in a close-knit group, they will tend to develop for the ordi-
nary run of problems norms that are wealth-maximizing.”132 Ellickson de-
fines wealth-maximizing norms as those that minimize the sum of 
transaction costs and deadweight losses that the members of a group objec-
tively incur.133 Those involved in the group activity are likely to develop 
rules in a utilitarian manner, preferring “bright-line rules that would elimi-
nate arguments to fuzzy rules that would prolong disputes.”134 The few as-
teroid mining companies currently in existence are not only a close-knit 
group under Ellickson’s definition,135 but are best positioned to create rules 
that will give rise to greater clarity and reduce transaction costs due to their 
proximity to and soon-to-be-developed experience with the business of as-
teroid mining. Rules like these would incentivize asteroid mining through 
greater legal clarity and predictability, thus facilitating the delivery of aster-
oid mining’s benefits to all mankind.
The UNCLOS ratification debate helps illustrate why a more substantial 
regulatory regime might prove counterproductive for the international 
community. One of the primary reasons cited by American opponents of rat-
ification is that accession to the treaty would subject American mining 
companies “to the whims of an unelected and unaccountable bureaucracy 
and would force them to pay excessive fees to the International Seabed Au-
127. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK 395 (Harrison Hayford et al. eds., 1988) (1851).
128. Id. at 396.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 395.
131. Id.
132. Ellickson, Hypothesis, supra note 125, at 84.
133. Id. (“A norm is ‘wealth-maximizing’ when it operates to minimize the members’
objective sum of (1) transaction costs, and (2) deadweight losses arising from failures to ex-
ploit potential gains from trade.”).
134. Id. at 87.
135. See id. at 84 (noting that “informal social control” is a key element of a close-knit 
group).
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thority for redistribution to developing countries.”136 While other commenta-
tors have dismissed these concerns as “pure nonsense,” noting that these 
same companies favor accession to the treaty for the sake of having a clear 
legal claim to mined minerals,137 it is easy to imagine that a similar scheme 
of bureaucratic redistribution in the context of asteroid mining might be dis-
regarded by the United States. A decision by nations leading the way on as-
teroid mining to opt out of a treaty would for all practical purposes cripple 
future treaty efforts. A key advantage of the proposed regulatory framework 
described in this Note is a practical one: it would offer the attractive pro-
spect of legal clarity without an international bureaucratic bogeyman, mak-
ing it more likely that key national stakeholders like the United States would 
sign on.
Conclusion
Maintaining the international character of outer space while allowing 
private companies to develop their own governing norms under a slightly 
revised OST would preempt the outbreak of a new race by sovereign gov-
ernments to colonize space; create greater certainty for those undertaking 
the enterprise of asteroid mining; and permit the development of an efficient 
system tailored to maximize returns on celestial investment. The asteroid 
mining industry has the potential to confer benefits on all mankind as a 
means of facilitating space travel, spurring the development of science and 
technology, mitigating the potential for a calamitous asteroid impact, and 
facilitating climate change mitigation efforts. As such, it is in the interest of 
all nations to revise the OST to allow greater certainty in this endeavor.
While the “entire unimaginable infinity of creation”138 is still out of reach 
based on our existing physics and engineering capabilities, asteroid mining 
is a critical step in beginning to harness celestial resources and more fully 
explore the intricacies of the universe around us.
136. Thedore R. Bromund et al., 7 Reasons U.S. Should Not Ratify UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (June 4, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/global-
politics/commentary/7-reasons-us-should-not-ratify-un-convention-the-law-the-sea.
137. Stewart M. Patrick, (Almost) Everyone Agrees: The U.S. Should Ratify the Law of 
the Sea Treaty, ATLANTIC (June 10, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2012/06/-almost-everyone-agrees-the-us-should-ratify-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty/258301/. The 
article also notes that Lockheed Martin, one of the companies interested in deep seabed min-
ing, “could not assume investment risks until it was clear that it would have a clear legal title 
to its findings.” Id.
138. ADAMS, supra note 1, at 70.
